內 容
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【宗研所專題講座】
時間:113年12月25日(三)12:00-14:00
地點:介仁校區2C110花道教室
講者:倪杰(Jeffrey Nicolaisen,玄奘大學宗教與文化學系助理教授)
講題:從Peter Singer和昭慧法師的哲學思考痛苦計量的跨物種倫理
How many cats equal one human? Thinking about the cross-species ethics of calculating suffering through the philosophy of Peter Singer and Shih Chao-hwei
講座簡介：本講座將澳洲功利主義哲學家彼得·辛格的多物種繁榮倫理與台灣佛教釋昭慧法師的多物種繁榮倫理進行比較。 1992年，昭慧法師和她的追隨者創立了生命保護協會（LCA），並引領了台灣的動物保護運動。到 1996 年，LCA 的合作者出版了辛格 1975 年著作《動物解放》的中文譯本。昭慧法師的佛教倫理與辛格的功利主義倫理的一致性是顯著的。辛格主張“平等考慮一切眾生的利益”，而昭慧法師則主張“保護生命”和“生命平等”的佛教理念。雖然倫理學趨同，但這些倫理學起源的思想根源卻不同。辛格的想法無可否認地源自於功利主義倫理學，但他們也致力於自然主義本體論，該本體論假設意識源自於個體大腦或具體神經網路的離散物理基礎的複雜性。相反，昭慧法師主張佛教中沒有本體論，而是將意識定位在主體與客體不斷交融的狀態，如無我概念所表達的。無我的概念對於個人效用的計算是難以處理的，因為它否認任何可以量化快樂和痛苦的獨特個體的最終存在。 2016年，在「利他主義與菩薩思想」會議上進行了為期三天的對話後，辛格表示，他「仍在努力解決」佛教的無我概念，並認為這對美國人民來說無法令人信服。在這次演講中，我透過比較昭慧法師與辛格的哲學，思考昭慧法師如何利用緣起觀念來達到無我以及「保護生命」和「生命平等」的倫理，結論是無我和緣起的非本體論可能對非人類福祉的哲學論述做出貢獻，這種哲學論述常常假定自然離散的自我是所有眾生福祉的基礎。
This talk compares the ethics of multi-species flourishing of the Australian utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer with that of the Taiwanese Buddhist nun Shih Chao-hwei. In 1992, Chao-hwei and her followers founded the Life Conservationist Association (LCA) and spearheaded the animal protection movement in Taiwan. By 1996, LCA’s collaborators published a Chinese translation of Singer’s 1975 book Animal Liberation. The alignment of Chao-hwei’s Buddhist ethics and Singer’s utilitarian ethics was remarkable. Singer advocated for the “equal consideration of interests” of all sentient beings while Chao-hwei advocated for the Buddhist concepts of “protecting life” and “equality of life.” While the ethics converged, the intellectual roots from which these ethics originated differed. Singer’s ideas undeniably spring from utilitarian ethics, but they are also committed to a naturalist ontology that presumes consciousness arises from the complexity of the discrete physical substrate of individual brains or embodied neural networks. On the contrary, Chao-hwei asserts that there is no ontology in Buddhism, but rather locates consciousness in the constant blending of subject and object as expressed in the concept of no-self. The concept of no-self is unwieldy for the calculus of individual utility, as it denies the ultimate existence of any distinct individuals for whom pleasure and pain might be quantifiable. Following their three-day dialogue at the “Altruism and Bodhisattva Thought” conference in 2016, Singer said he was “still grappling” with the Buddhist concept of no self and thought that it would not be convincing to people in the United States. In this talk, by comparing the philosophy of Chao-hwei to that of Singer, I consider how Chao-hwei uses the concept of dependent origination to arrive at no-self and the ethics of “protecting life” and “equality of life,” concluding with what the non-ontology of no-self and dependent origination may have to contribute to the philosophical discourse on nonhuman welfare that too often presumes a natural discrete self as the foundation of the well-being of all sentient beings.
演講內容精彩可期，歡迎聆聽。
備註：本次講座提供餐點，敬請踴躍參加！欲報名者請mail至tang@gms.tcu.edu.tw,感恩。 |
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